Abstract

Logic encryption has emerged to be a potential solution to the problem of Intellectual Property (IP)-Piracy and counterfeiting. However, in the recent past, several attacks have been mounted on existing logic encryption strategies to extract the secret key. SAT attack, the most predominant one among them, exploits the unprotected Design-for-Testability (DfT) infrastructure as a backdoor to launch attacks on sequential circuits. Protecting the DfT infrastructure is of paramount importance to ensure the security of an Integrated Chip (IC). In this paper, we propose a new logic encryption scheme which dynamically obfuscates the scan operation for an unauthorized attempt of scan access. A detailed security analysis on the proposed secure DfT infrastructure demonstrates its ability to thwart SAT attack without compromising the testability of the design. A methodical key-gate placement strategy enables the proposed scheme to eliminate the leakage of key information through weak key-gate locations, offering protection against path sensitization and logic cone based attacks. Unlike other state-of-the-art SAT preventive schemes, our proposed method does not suffer from poor output corruption, which is a fundamental requirement of a logic encryption scheme.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call