Abstract
In this paper we document empirical evidence regarding the unintended consequences of financial regulatory changes on market liquidity of Mexican sovereign debt. We find mixed impacts: in the context of Basel 2.5, Basel III and the Liquidity Coverage Ratio, we find negative effects, while in the case of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Volcker Rule we find positive effects. The difference in results can be explained by the fact that some of the regulatory changes mainly imposed additional constraints on government debt holdings, while others were designed to enhance transparency and thus reduce uncertainty as well as information asymmetries. Moreover, our estimates suggest that the aggregate effect of the regulatory changes decreased the weekly turnover ratio of Mexican sovereign debt securities by 18 percent. Our results hold under different liquidity measures and different econometric specifications.
Published Version
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