Abstract
We study a spatial evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on regular network's one-dimensional regular ring and two-dimensional square lattice. The individuals located on the sites of networks can either cooperate with their neighbors or defect. The effects of individual's self-examination are introduced. Using Monte Carlo simulations and pair approximation method, we investigate the average density of cooperators in the stationary state for various values of payoff parameters b and the time interval Δt. The effects of the fraction p of players in the system who are using the self-examination on cooperation are also discussed. It is shown that compared with the case of no individual's self-examination, the persistence of cooperation is inhibited when the payoff parameter b is small and at certain Δt (Δt > 0) or p (p > 0), cooperation is mostly inhibited, while when b is large, the emergence of cooperation can be remarkably enhanced and mostly enhanced at Δt = 0 or p = 1.
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