Economy of an Intra-state Armed Conflict: The Case of Syria

Abstract

Contemporary international relations have been witnessing many armed conflicts. As usual, they do not cause dissolution of states due to the factors that include adaptation of economies to extraordinary conditions with common and specific features of country cases. The need of analyzing them to find ways for conflicts’ settlement explains the theoretical importance of the article. Facing the diversity of notions describing conflicts, the author assumes existence of a notion of economy of an intra-state armed conflict (EISAC). Such hypothesis looks new exploiting two groups of arguments based on content analysis and empiric materials accumulated during the author’s stints as a diplomat in Damascus. Firstly, any EISAC has closer links with the conflict itself than the relevant state. It can emerge under scenarios of “failed state” (Somalia), “partially failed state” (Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen), parallel economies (Syria), a formal split of a state (South Sudan), or in more than a country (ISIS). Secondly, Libya, Syria, and Yemen have proved that the EISAC does not mean manipulation with meanings of similar definitions including a wartime militarized economy or a peace-time defense sector (USSR, North Korea) not correlating with the crisis generating economy (Lebanon) or the sanctioned economy (Iraq:1980-2003, Iran). Also, it does not make a hyponym of the economy in a conflict inspired by foreign aggression (Kuwait: 1990-1991). Yet, the scale of damage caused by foreign aggressions could be compared with that resulting from intra-state conflicts. Syria has been chosen as its economy has acquired classical features of the EISAC.