Economics and antitrust enforcement at the EU: an update

Abstract

Abstract We extend the dataset, revise, and improve the methodology applied in empirically measuring the role of economics in antitrust enforcement by European Commission’s DG for Competition (EC’s DGCOMP), first examined in Katsoulacos and Makri (2021, this journal). Infringement decisions from 1992 to 2021 are now examined, including a number of important digital and hi-tech market decisions from 2018 to 2021. The revised methodology significantly clarifies the role of potential assessment screens in identifying eight (rather than five) potential Legal Standards, also taking into account the Quick Look standards. Additionally, we now distinguish evidence presented depending on the burden of proof. Thus, we capture the role of economic analysis and evidence applied by DGCOMP, in proving that conduct is anti-competitive, through the new Cumulative Economic Analysis Indicator, as distinguished from the role of efficiency analysis presented by defendants and then assessed by DGCOMP, which is now independently measured; combined, these define a new indicator of the Total Economic Evidence presented during assessment. The quality of enforcement by DGCOMP, measured by the closeness of the weighted average Cumulative Economic Analysis Indicator empirically identified for different conduct types to its theoretically optimal (decision error minimizing) level, is captured and its evolution is considered and compared to other Competition Authorities.