Abstract
ABSTRACT This study investigates the strength of economic voting in Turkey under various types of governments. A vote equation developed for this purpose, which takes into account all of the key factors mentioned in the economic voting literature, shows that voters hold coalition governments less responsible for their economic performance than single-party governments and minor partners of a coalition government less responsible than its major member. These gaps widen as political fragmentation of the government increases. In governments involving many parties and parties with significantly different ideologies, some of the junior coalition members benefit rather than suffer from a bad economy.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
