Economic Polarization and Cabinet Formation in Western Europe

Abstract

Recent literature has offered a variety of explanations of how cabinet coalitions form in parliamentary democracies. Most studies have overlooked the possibility that the political economy might influence these negotiations significantly. This study proposes an empirical political-economic model of cabinet formation, drawing on data from a 29-year period (1956-1984) for 10 European parliamentary democracies. The analysis distinguishes two sets of contextual influences on coalition formation: the decisional and the systemic. The decisional context is subdivided into two dimensions which are expected to influence independently the outcomes of negotiations. Measures of each context and dimension are derived and included in a model testing the effects on coalition formation. Minimumwinning coalitions are likely to form under conditions free of economic polarization; oversized coalitions under more complex conditions of economic polarization, hyperpluralism, and lack of consensus in the political environment; and minority coalitions under conditions characteristic of a consensual system.