Ebû Ali es-Sekûnî’de Bilgi ve Aklî Hüküm

Abstract

Abū Ali al-Sakūnī (d. 717/1317), who was born in Andalusia and grew up in Maghrib territory, mostly adopted a critical attitude to the later Muslim theologians and logicians, following the footsteps of Abū Baqr al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013) in the formation of his own theological views. However, he made use of logicians in terms of the classification of knowledge in general and of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) in terms of his views on knowledge derived from granting assent on the other. Logical judgment, which is said to be one of the principal elements of the knowledge achieved by granting assent or alternatively regarded as a substitute for knowledge of that kind occupies a central place in the systematical thought of Sakūnī as a whole. For him, among the judgments, which provide a certain basis for all sciences, particularly the rational judgments are of great importance. Because rational judgments are not liable to any changes or modifications, they are subject to examination in the science of Kalām in this respect. Additionally, in Sakūnī’s system, we find that rational judgments are located at the very junction point where his own views on the topic and those of philosophers have collided. For instance, his classification of rational judgment, particularly one that is logically necessary, shows a striking similarity to the understanding of necessity by philosophers such as Abu’l-Hasan al-‘Āmirī (d. 381/992) and Avicenna (d. 428/1037). This article will examine Sakūnī’s work Tamyīz to ascertain his understanding of knowledge and rational judgment.