Dynamic Power Strategy Space for Non-Cooperative Power Game with Pricing

Abstract

Nash non-cooperative power game can be effectively used to find the power equilibrium point to enhance edge user throughput in downlink multi-user multiple-input multipleoutput (MU-MIMO) wireless networks. However, the power strategy space of the existing Nash non-cooperative power games are generally statically pre-determined without adapting to the changing wireless environment. To address this problem, we explore a novel framework of Nash non-cooperative power game with dynamic and environment-adaptive power strategy space. Then, we propose a non-cooperative water-filling power game with pricing (WFPGP), wherein the power strategy space is dynamically determined by iterative water- filling algorithm. We derive the sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of the WFPGP game which can be implemented in a distributed manner. Simulation results are used to compare the performance of WFPGP with the other Nash non- cooperative power games and confirm the stable and superior performance advantages of WFPGP.