Dynamic Game Theoretic Model of Multi-Layer Infrastructure Networks

Abstract

Due to similarities in terms of network structure and interactions among them, most infrastructure systems can be viewed as coupled layers of a generalized transportation network in which the passenger, freight, data, water, and energy flows are the commodities in the different layers. The coupling is due to the varying degrees of interactions among these layers in terms of shared physical networks, budgetary constraints, socio-economic environments, environmental concerns, information/other resources, and in particular, functional interdependencies. However, these interactions are normally ignored in the engineering planning, design and analysis of infrastructure systems. Identifying and understanding these interactions using a holistic perspective can lead to more efficient infrastructure systems. This paper presents a preliminary network flow equilibrium model of dynamic multi-layer infrastructure networks in the form of a differential game involving two essential time scales. In particular, three coupled network layers—automobiles, urban freight and data—are modeled as being comprised of Cournot-Nash dynamic agents. An agent-based simulation solution structure is introduced to solve the flow equilibrium and optimal budget allocation problem for these three layers under the assumption of a super authority that oversees investments in the infrastructure of all three technologies and thereby creates a dynamic Stackelberg leader-follower game.