Duncan Sandys and the Projection of British Power after Suez

Abstract

Duncan Sandys' tenure at the Ministry of Defence has usually been seen as one of the major turning points in post-war British defence policy. The consensus is that Sandys was a prime mover in bringing about a contraction of Britain's military capabilities in an era when economic constraints, coupled with the need for Britain to play a full part in maintaining the Western deterrent against Soviet expansion in Europe, dictated that Britain's ability to project military power beyond Europe had to shrink. Sandys' task was “radically pruning Britain's military capacity and adopting a defence posture more in keeping with a medium-size power.” This shift in policy was brought about by the April 1957 Defence White Paper. It amounted to “the biggest change in military policy ever made in normal times.” But emphasising that the Sandys White Paper was part of the wider process of decolonisation and nuclearisation overlooks the fact that in the seven years after it was published the British used conventional forces to mount no fewer than three expeditionary operations outside Europe.