Don't Forsake Mongolia

Abstract

M easured in terms of security, survival, or economic well-being, the United States has no vital interest in Mongolia. Yet it would be a colossal error to forsake Mongolia. The modest—but meaningful—mission of the United States in Mongolia should be maintained. In Mongolia, the United States offers succor to an independent, democratic state that has emerged from decades of Soviet domination determined to help itself. Providing $285 million through the Millennium Challenge Corporation, military training and assistance, USAID funding, Peace Corps volunteers, and other forms of political and economic support, Washington has underscored its commitment to Mongolia’s self-sufficiency, prosperity, democracy, and quality of life. Mongolia has been an appreciative and cooperative partner, sending troops to Iraq and to Afghanistan. However, U.S. policy toward Mongolia is not so much about what the United States “gets” by assisting as about what the United States is. Washington’s credibility, relevance, and integrity are at stake. In 1990, when Mongolia undertook the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, from planned to market economy, from dependence on Soviet assistance to independence and international citizenship, Washington may have imagined geopolitical advantage resulting from support of Mongolia. Although U.S. and Mongolian statesmen speak of common values, geopolitics has surely suffused Washington’s calculus. After all, Mongolia is landlocked, with Russia to the north and China to the south. Washington’s impulse to seek strategic advantage in that neighborhood must be compelling. For two decades, Mongolia has been visited by a stream of high-ranking U.S. officials and dignitaries, including President George W. Bush in 2005. Washington’s fascination must stem not only from Mongolia’s determination to embrace democracy but also from its steely, yet tactful, determination to