Domestic institutions and the Political Accountability Model

Abstract

As we argued in the previous chapter, the foreign policy choices of state leaders reflect calculations about the constraints and opportunities for pursuing territorial claims in the strategic setting of international politics. This chapter, as well as the two following chapters, constitute the central theoretical chapters of the book, in which domestic political institutions are given center-stage in three models that seek to explain what types of diplomatic and military policies will be adopted by political leaders in territorial disputes. These three models can be viewed as related, but nevertheless distinct, theoretical approaches for analyzing the democratic peace. Their common foundation is that each considers how domestic political institutions shape foreign policy choices. Each model, however, focuses on a different causal mechanism that links domestic institutions to the choices made by political leaders: Institutions are a source of political accountability for leaders' decisions on matters of foreign policy (Political Accountability Model). Institutions are a source of norms for bargaining and conflict resolution in international disputes (Political Norms Model). The similarity of institutions between states is a source of international threat perception and political alignment for state leaders (Political Affinity Model). The Political Accountability Model centers on the ability of political opposition to punish and reward political leaders for the success or failure of the diplomatic and military policies they pursue. The Political Norms Model views domestic institutions as influencing the principles by which political elites bargain and resolve political conflict. These domestic-based principles, then, also influence how leaders bargain internationally.