Abstract
Desperate for money, Eleanor and her father Roscoe plan to rob a bank. Roscoe fears that Eleanor might change her mind at an inopportune moment. To insure that Eleanor will proceed with the plans, Roscoe secretly implants a mechanism in Eleanor’s brain. Should Eleanor give any indication that she is unwilling to go along with the bank robbery, Roscoe will use the device to render Eleanor unable to do anything other than rob the bank. As it happens, despite a splitting headache, Eleanor willingly robs the bank with her father. The device is never activated. 1 Examples like the one involving Roscoe and Eleanor, originally developed by Harry Frankfurt, have been used to show that an agent can be held morally responsible for what she does do, even if she cannot do otherwise. 2 I shall hereafter refer to such examples as “Frankfurt examples.” In the above Frankfurt example Eleanor acted willingly and therefore seems to be morally responsible for robbing the bank. Yet because of the device she is unable to avoid robbing the bank. Frankfurt examples challenge the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). PAP states that an agent is morally responsible for what she does only if she could have done otherwise. But the case of Eleanor and Roscoe is a counter-example to PAP. Eleanor is responsible, but she could not have done otherwise. Or so it seems. In “A Compatibilist Theory of Alternative Possibilities” Joseph Kiem Campbell defends the traditional strong compatibilist account of free will and moral responsibility. 3 According to Campbell, strong compatibilism can be distinguished from weak compatibilism in that strong compatibilism entails that PAP is necessary for moral responsibility; weak compatibilism does not. Campbell maintains that the
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