Does Self-Identity Persist Into Old Age?

Abstract

This chapter considers the main areas of philosophical dispute bearing on the question of whether, and how, self-identity persists into old age. The author treats the salient aspects of larger debates about whether bodily continuity should be a criterion for self-identity, about the durability or otherwise of character, about possible definitional limits on how far self-identity can persist over the long duree, and the about whether there may be, as Strawson suggests, differences of ‘“existential” style’ affecting how individuals experience, and think about, the ontic depth of the self. The primary political and psychological significance of such arguments about identity persistence is seen to lie in how we apply the available criteria for personal and self-identity as we move between third- and first-person accounts of the self. There is, it is argued, a gap here in the philosophical literature, and in our public discourse – most starkly evident in responses to cases of serious cognitive impairment.