Abstract
This chapter is the beginning of an investigation into the concept of personal identity and the merits and demerits of the two principal kinds of account of personal identity offered in the philosophical literature: the “mentalistic” kind of account (in terms principally of memory or some variant on memory) associated with Locke and in our time Sydney Shoemaker, and the “bodily continuity” kind of account associated with Bernard Williams.
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