Does self‐organizing policy network provide effective waste services? An empirical evaluation of institutional collective action and transaction cost dilemmas

Abstract

AbstractThis paper examines institutional collective action and transaction cost (TC) dilemmas in a self‐organizing policy network involving federal, state, and municipal agencies for waste services in a port and industrial park. A thematic analysis revealed dilemmas in: (a) vertical levels, which lack leadership in industrial waste management due to unclear responsibility delegation across government levels; (b) horizontal levels, reluctant to take responsibilities and define jurisdiction boundaries for efficient waste services; and (c) functional levels, which exhibit fragmented and unaligned action scopes. Transaction costs, stemming from a deficiency in expertise, infrastructure, and organized information regarding companies' waste management, hinder effective programs and policies. Without tackling these challenges and TCs through a governance framework that includes implementation strategies, monitoring, and institutional controls, the self‐organizing policy network is likely to remain stuck in collective institutional inertia.