Abstract
Is determinism compatible with moral responsibility? Until recently, most philosophers — compatibilists and incompatibilists alike — believed that the answer to this question depends crucially on whether persons are (in the relevant sense) able to act otherwise in a deterministic world. They had this belief because they accepted the intuitively very plausible Principle of Alternate Possibilities (henceforth: PAP): [A] person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise.1 KeywordsMoral ResponsibilityAlternate PossibilityRelevant SenseDeterministic WorldFamous PaintingThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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