Abstract

The issue of free will is a complex one that has occupied the minds of many theologians and philosophers through the ages. The two main aspects of free will are the freedom to do otherwise and the power of self-determination. This means that an agent must be able to choose from alternative possibilities and that he or she must be the author or source of that choice. Defined as such, it is clear that the issue of free will is undeniably closely linked with the concept of moral responsibility. However, if we live in a deterministic world, where everything is governed by the laws of nature, including our thoughts and behaviour, does this leave room for free will and moral responsibility? As Dutch neurobiologist and author Dick Swaab argues, the answer is an emphatic ‘no’. In this article, we will look at Swaab’s case against free will. We will also see what modern neuroscience has to say about this hot topic and whether it supports or discredits Swaab’s views. And finally, we will touch on what this all means for moral responsibility. Contribution: This article is part of a special collection that reflects on the evolutionary building blocks of our past, present and future. It is based on historical thought and contemporary research. It fits well with the intersectional and inter-disciplinary nature of this collection and journal.

Highlights

  • Many theologians and philosophers through the centuries have been grappling with the complex issue of free will

  • The complexity of free will is illustrated by the interrelatedness of free will with issues such as responsibility, morality, consciousness, mind-body relationship and psychiatry (Kane 2011)

  • According to Meuleman and Van Vlastuin (2014:2), ‘neurobiological concerns’ – which will be the focus of our article – ‘touch upon important questions about responsibility, accountability, morality and autonomy’. They reason that ‘at its core, the issue of free will has to do with the real identity of the human being’ (Meuleman & Van Vlastuin 2014:2)

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Summary

Introduction

Many theologians and philosophers through the centuries have been grappling with the complex issue of free will. They reason that ‘at its core, the issue of free will has to do with the real identity of the human being’ (Meuleman & Van Vlastuin 2014:2). The first is called incompatibilism or hard determinism.2 This view says that free will is incompatible with determinism, and according to Meuleman and Van Vlastuin (2014), it: 2.Representatives are Martin Luther, Baruch Spinoza, Laplace and Derk Pereboom.

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