Does Kierkegaard think beliefs can be directly willed?

Abstract

In a recent book, Religious Belief and the Will1 Louis Pojman has analyzed and criticized several forms of what he terms volitionalism, which is a position which regards beliefs as under the control of the will. Pojman distinguishes several kinds of volitionalism.2 First, he distinguishes prescriptive from descriptive volitionalism. Prescriptive volitionalism is a normative doctrine which holds that it is permissible, perhaps even obligatory, to will to hold certain beliefs. Descriptive volitionalism is a psychological theory which holds that the will actually does have the power to do this. Pojman also distinguishes direct from indirect volitionalism. Direct volitionalism treats the action by which a belief is formed as a basic action which can simply be willed. Indirect volitionalism regards the formation of a belief as an outcome of doing other actions. Both prescriptive and descriptive volitionalism can be either direct or indirect. In his book Pojman analyzes Kierkegaard as a classic example of volitionalism. He sees Kierkegaard as a direct volitionalist who accepts both descriptive and prescriptive volitionalism. Indeed, Kierkegaard is said to hold the extreme position that all of our beliefs are acquired by direct acts of will.3 Kierkegaard and volitionalists in general are strongly criticized by Pojman on several counts. Direct, descriptive volitionalism is said to run afoul of psychological laws and to involve a conceptual confusion as well.4 While Pojman allows that we can and do modify beliefs indirectly, and thus concedes the truth of indirect, descriptive volitionalism, he claims that prescriptive volitionalism, direct or indirect, is subject to censure. A plausible ethics of belief must see truth-seeking as a strong, prima facie duty,5 but forming a belief through an act of will, which Pojman insists must mean forming it independently of evidential considerations,6 shows a lack of concern for truth. It is in fact a kind of lying to oneself.7