Does hostility affect public support for the provision of global public goods among competing neighboring countries? A survey experiment in Northeast Asia

Abstract

Cooperation beyond the borders of sovereign states and investment in global public goods (GPGs) are essential for tackling transboundary challenges, such as climate change, marine pollution, and health security. However, little is known about how regional tension or isolationism might affect cooperation with neighboring countries on transboundary issues. Thus, in this study, using a conjoint experiment of representative samples from members of the public in Japan, China, and South Korea, we investigated: 1) public support for GPGs using the case of trilateral cooperation for the establishment of common global funds among Japan, China, and South Korea; and 2) the extent to which hostility toward neighboring countries affects such public support. The results showed that Chinese people had lower hostility toward neighboring countries and higher public support. Both Japanese and South Koreans had higher hostility. Meanwhile, public support was lower in Japan but moderate in South Korea. These results suggest that hostility toward neighboring countries affects public support for GPGs. The stronger the hostility toward neighboring countries is, the lower the public support for international cooperation becomes. However, the mechanisms of these effects are complex. Generally, hostility toward a government has more negative effects than hostility toward people of the same country. Furthermore, the present study provides important insights based on the findings that Chinese strongly supported building GPGs with neighboring countries, and people in all three countries somewhat supported equal sharing of the financial burden. However, authorization mechanisms for GPGs are essential, because citizens most supported GPGs managed by their home country. Thus, adopting authorization mechanisms to mutually manage funds is essential for widening public support for GPGs.