Abstract
while arguing that art, like science, is cognitive, we have at best gained for a dubious victory. 'Miserable' is Hoy's word. If, however, science is in the last analysis shown to be truth-giving, much like is truth-giving, it may be replied that methods of establishing aesthetic quality in illuminate methods of establishing cognitive truth in science. This can, in turn, shed light on the meaning of truth-as-conventional. Indeed this was a cardinal aim of the paper on which Hoy is commenting, and in which Nelson Goodman is quoted approvingly: Truth and its aesthetic counterpart amount to appropriateness under different names. If we speak of hypotheses but not of works of as true, that is because we reserve the terms 'true' and 'false' for symbols in sentential form. Again: . . when we examine our tests for truth in science we find them far from alien to tests for quality in art ([12], p. 264, and [13]). If this involves us in a conception of truth (as Hoy contends), nevertheless it points a way toward further clarifying the pragmatic conception, now drawing upon criticism
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
