Documents: Fillers of Informational Gaps

Abstract

1. A Proposed Definition of 'Document'In 2005 Barry Smith proposed the following definition of document:x is a document =def x is a (potentially permanent) record of time-sensitive information, and is of a type instances of which are reliably used as constituents of instances of types of complex social actions.1Let me use this definition as a starting point for some considerations concerning documents and their use. I will begin by commenting on some details.First, the definition implies that documents are used as constituents of actions. This means, presumably, that the information recorded in a document has some impact on an action in which it is used. Using a document as toilet paper, for instance, is not to use it as a constituent of an action in the relevant sense. In this case, the document is not used as a document. The document as such and the information recorded in it remain external to the action. This shows that to use a document as a document is to use the information it conveys. If the document is to be used as a constituent of an action, this information must somehow play a role in the constitution of the action.Actions have constituents of rather different kinds. Some constituents of actions are sub-actions, some are agents, and some are tools. Documents are constituents of actions in the way tools are. Their use is an action, which may be a constituent of a further action. Besides the constituents of an action, there are further factors that may enter the constitution of an action without being proper parts of this action, such as presuppositions and preconditions.The information recorded in a document may enter the constitution of an action in two ways. First, the use of a document may be a sub-action of this action. When a passport is shown when checking in for a flight, its use is part of the complex action, checking in for a flight. Second, the information recorded in a document may influence an action in the way of a presupposition or external condition. In order to get married, for instance, both partners might have to provide documents to prove that they are not currently married. Here, the use of the document is not part of the marriage itself, but only one of the conditions that make it possible. Let me suggest that a document plays a role in an action when its use either is a part of or a precondition for this action.Smith's definition implies further that documents play a role in complex actions. To me this seems to be a matter of fact, not of definition. I can see no reason why we should not allow for the (exceptional) case that a document figures in actions that are as simple as it gets. It is in any case not obvious how the distinction between complex and simple actions should be drawn. Later in this paper it will turn out that the actions in which documents are used must have some teleological structure. In this sense, they may perhaps be said to be complex. But for one thing, every action that involves a movement can be shown to be complex in this way.2 For another, that actions must be complex in the specified sense can be demonstrated. Therefore, it need not be put into the definition.For similar reasons, I suggest omitting the qualification 'social'. There may, certainly, be reasons why we use documents of certain types only or primarily in social actions, but these reasons do not belong in a definition of the term 'document'. That documents are used in social actions should not even be entailed by the definition, since documents might be used in actions that are as nonsocial as any action can be. The secret diary kept by a cryptographer is a document, even if no one but its author will ever be able to read it.Another problem is that the definition has it that documents are 'o/a type instances of which are reliably used as' instances satisfying a certain further condition. Unless the generality of the type in question is clearly restricted, this wording seems open to a leak in the definition. …