Do Territorial Control and the Loss of Territory Determine the use of Indiscriminate Violence by Incumbent Actors? An Examination of the Syrian Civil War in Aleppo over 45 weeks.

Evan Tyner

doi:10.15664/jtr.812

Abstract

This study tests the ‘control-collaboration’ model detailed by Stathis Kalyvas in The Logic of Violence in Civil War (2006). The control-collaboration model makes various theoretical claims on the relationship between territorial control and the use and motivations of violence (whether selective or indiscriminate). This study tests two of the key claims made in the model: 1. There is an inverse relationship between level of territorial control and the use of indiscriminate violence; and, 2. The loss off territory encourages the use of indiscriminate violence. Using data on civilian and child deaths taken from the ‘Syrian Martyr Database’, this study examines the relationship between territorial control and territorial loss, and the use of indiscriminate violence by incumbent (Syrian state) forces. Examining the levels of territorial control/loss and the extent of civilian and child casualties in Aleppo, Syria, results of the study largely support the theoretical assumptions outlined by Kalyvas.

Highlights

The Syrian Conflict has raged since July 2011, resulting in a death toll of over 250,000 the displacement of 12 million people (United Nations, 2015)
This study has examined an area of civil war and domestic and international crisis, which to date has been largely unexplored by micro-dynamic theorists of intra-state conflict
Data from the 45 week period of the Battle of Aleppo has shown that the level of territorial control is inversely related to the rate of death of civilians and children, and the use of indiscriminate violence by incumbent forces

Summary

Introduction

The Syrian Conflict (or Civil War) has raged since July 2011, resulting in a death toll of over 250,000 the displacement of 12 million people (United Nations, 2015). The complex nature of the Syrian Civil War makes it a very interesting, yet to date scarcely researched, topic for micro-dynamic study. The first part is concerned with alliances and transactions between supralocal and local actors, whereby local actors (e.g. civilians) are considered valuable resources and control over them in conflicts (especially civil wars [1]) is vital (Vargas, 2009, 111). This part of the model argues that violent actors in a conflict desire the collaboration of civilians (especially in disputed territory) and

Methods

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Discussion

Conclusion