Abstract

The question as to whether political influence can benefit the commercial activity of companies, and the relatedquestions surrounding political corruption that arise, are of perennial fascination for persons at every level of societyand in every country. With this in mind, this article seeks to explore the relationship between political connections incommercial firms and investment efficiency. This relationship will be studied on an empirical basis, and will shed somelight on the actual parameters, mechanisms, and effects of political influence in the business sphere in the RussianFederation.In this research, we consider only direct relations between business operators and the members of Russian ministries,councils, political parties, heads of the regions and cities. These relationships are categorised as being politicallyinfluential depending on the status of the politician, and whether they are active at a federal, regional or municipallevel. Connections with such politicians are examined where there is evidence of direct links with company CEOs andchairmen of the boards of directors of companies.This research is carried out on the sample of 106 Russian non-financial companies for the period 2010–2015. 44companies from the final sample were considered as politically connected on at least one level. Some firms haveconnections more than at one level (11 companies). Companies have politically connected chairman of the board (36companies) more often than connected CEO (26 companies). Using regression analysis, we determined whether thepolitical ties in Russia have a positive or a negative impact on the investment expenditures of companies.Interestingly, and perhaps contrary to popular belief, we identified a negative relationship between political ties and theefficiency of investment decisions for individual companies. The presence of politically-connected CEOs at federal andregional levels is seen to have a significant negative impact on investment efficiency. However, our results also indicatethat the presence of politically-connected chairmen of the board which are active at the municipal level is correlatedwith efficient investment activity. This indicates that political influence at this level may be responsible for more prudentrecommendations regarding commercial and investment decisions. Overall, it can be seen that in this sample ofcompanies from the Russian Federation, the presence of state-tied representatives may be aligned with a tendency forcompanies to follow targets that are favourable for its government connections and not for the firm itself.Although political connections have a mixed impact on the company’s value, the relation with investment efficiency isprimarily negative. Thus, we may reason that the government has a strong power over politically-related companies.Such influences are linked with a tendency for companies to deviate from their primary goal of value maximisation.These results may indicate the influence of undue pressure from a government which strives to reach its own goalsthrough the mechanism of commercial activity, or perhaps the opportunistic behaviour of individuals in managementpositions who are motivated towards personal political gain at the expense of the company. Political connections have amixed effect on the company’s performance and investment efficiency, and we postulate that firms establish relationshipswith government officials pursuing the goal to obtain more advantageous position. The links between political operatorsand business activity demonstrated in this research undoubtedly highlight some uncomfortable areas of discourse inthe commercial sphere. On a granular level, further research into specific transactions and motivations may seem morea research area for journalists or law enforcement investigators, but this may be simply a popular prejudice. There iscertainly ample opportunity for expanding the scope of this study’s results. Beyond the interests of political, sociologicaland legal researchers, the data presented herein will be of immediate interest to persons operating in the commercial,business, and economic spheres of the Russian Federation and internationally.

Highlights

  • Political connections have a negative influence on the investment efficiency of a company

  • We investigate whether political connections, through a chief executive officer or chairman of the board of directors have an influence on the company’s investment efficiency

  • We identified a negative influence of political connections on the investment efficiency of the company, on a basis of the existing empirical and theoretical literature

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Summary

Introduction

Political connections have a negative influence on the investment efficiency of a company. The government encourages firms to act in its interests and to reach goals favourable to it through the company’s management and board of directors. Opportunistic behaviour by top executives may be considered a cause of inefficiency-related problems. This takes place when they do not follow the firm’s primary aim of value maximisation and instead use existing corporate opportunities to gain personal benefits or to build an empire. Political connections have a mixed effect on the company’s performance and market share. Firms seek to establish relationships with government officials when pursuing a goal of obtaining a more advantageous position. Some executives even become politicians themselves in order to reach this target

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