Do Local Power-Sharing Deals Reduce Ethnopolitical Hostility? The Effects of ‘Negotiated Democracy’ in a Devolved Kenya

Emma Elfversson,Anders Sjögren

doi:10.1080/17449057.2019.1583483

Abstract

How do local power-sharing arrangements affect levels of ethnopolitical hostility? The introduction of decentralisation in contexts previously marked by communal conflict underscores the need to assess local power-sharing mechanisms. However, existing literature on power-sharing has mainly examined national-level arrangements. In this article we contribute to the literature on decentralisation and ethnopolitical conflict by analysing two conflict-affected cases in Kenya. We find that local power sharing in Nakuru made intercommunal relations less hostile than in Uasin Gishu, where no such arrangement was present. The introduction and effects of local power sharing, however, is highly conditioned by national politics.

Highlights

In many societies affected by violent conflict over central government power, decentralisation has been used to mitigate the effects of winner-takes-all politics at the national level (Brancati, 2006; Brown, 2008)
We expect that local power-sharing may reduce ethnopolitical hostility, in line with the findings by Bunte and Vinson. We expect that this outcome will be strongly conditioned by local–central relations and, by the extent to which local power sharing corresponds to the interests of the national political elite
In both Nakuru and Uasin Gishu, local relations between Kikuyu and Kalenjin were unsurprisingly characterised by hostility during the first years of the coalition government which ended the post-election violence (PEV) and by lingering suspicion even after the political alliance between Kikuyu and Kalenjin was forged at the national level

Summary

Introduction

In many societies affected by violent conflict over central government power, decentralisation has been used to mitigate the effects of winner-takes-all politics at the national level (Brancati, 2006; Brown, 2008). We find that local power sharing in Nakuru made intercommunal relations less hostile than in Uasin Gishu, where no such arrangement was present. In this context of prior communal conflict and decentralisation, how is ethnopolitical hostility affected by local political power-sharing?

Results

Conclusion