Abstract
Economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, as a response to its policies in Poland and Afghanistan, have been criticized as ineffective. Optimal sanctions can be derived as strategies which solve a dynamic mathematical game subject to uncertainty. They are analyzed here using a macroeconomic model of the Soviet economy and show that the Soviet Union is vulnerable to induced foreign exchange shortages. Current policies exploit that weakness.
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