Abstract

This paper conducts a cross-country assessment of the impacts of bank regulation and supervision on the stability of banking sectors. We find that in normal time more private monitoring of banks significantly reduces both the tail beta and the ordinary beta. Greater capital stringency reduces the ordinary beta, but increases the tail beta. Official supervision, bank activity restriction, or banking entry requirements do not have significant impacts on either of them. Finally, during the financial crises, only the restriction on the new entry of banks can significantly reduce the tail beta of the banking sectors.

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