Do anti-corruption campaigns affect IPO underpricing? Evidence from a central discipline inspection of the CSRC in China

Abstract

The system of central discipline inspections has become a key anti-corruption governance tool in China since 2013. This paper investigates the impact of a central discipline inspection of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) on initial public offering (IPO) underpricing. We find that IPO firms listed during the inspection period exhibit greater IPO underpricing than those listed outside the inspection period. The reason is the increased focus of the CSRC on maintaining capital market stability, which makes it more inclined to approve IPO firms with lower issue prices during the inspection period compared with other periods. We also find that IPO firms listed during the inspection period have better short-term market performance but poorer long-term returns than those listed outside the inspection period. Moreover, the effect of the anti-corruption inspection on IPO underpricing is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises, firms with low-quality auditors and firms located in regions with high corruption. Overall, our paper enriches the literature on IPO underpricing and the economic consequences of the central discipline inspection system.