Do all storks fly to Africa? Universal statements and the generic overgeneralization effect

Abstract

In this paper we examine people's tendency to accept false universal statements such as all storks fly to Africa or all lions have manes as true even though they know such statements are false. Similar outcome studies have sparked two different explanations for this puzzle: the generic overgeneralization effect (Leslie et al., 2011) and the quantifier domain restriction (Lazaridou-Chatzigoga et al., 2019). Following the modified research design by Lazaridou-Chatzigoga et al. (2019), our study aimed to maximally restrict the reported tendency among native Polish speakers by making them adopt an analytical mode of thinking. Contrary to the view held by Lazaridou-Chatzigoga et al., we assumed that the type of context has an impact on the acceptance rates of false universal statements. By controlling three types of contexts: natural, kind-driven/gender-driven, and exception-driven, we showed that this tendency can be attenuated but not eliminated. The paper concludes with a discussion of the assumptions held by two groups of researchers and argues that the generic overgeneralization effect is the only coherent explanation developed so far.