Diversity of interaction intensity enhances the cooperation of spatial multi-games on interdependent lattices

Abstract

We put forward a novel multi-games model based on the diversity of interaction intensity under the framework of interdependent lattices, where an adjustable variable ω is accustomed to regulate the interaction intensity between players. In detail, when the payoff of the focal player x gaining from his neighbor y is not less than the average payoff of the focal player x from four nearest neighbors, the interaction intensity between them is strengthened; otherwise, this intensity is weakened. In addition, the utility of players is mainly determined by their own payoff and also related to the payoff of that player occupying the same position on another lattice. Through extensive simulations, the results indicate that the diversity of interaction intensity between players can immensely favor the evolution of cooperation. The smaller ω means the stronger diversity of interaction intensity, which leads to the higher level of collective cooperation. Particularly, when the interaction intensity and the sucker's payoff are changed continuously, the cooperative behavior among individuals tends to become more complicated than that only driven by the network reciprocity. We also find that when the diversity is weak (ω>0.5), the utility coupling factor α does not seem to be a decisive element in facilitating the development of cooperation. However, when the diversity is strong (ω<0.5), the promotion of cooperation becomes more remarkable. Our work also illustrates the pivotal role of diversity of interaction intensity in solving complex social dilemmas, which will inspire us to comprehend the cooperation behavior in numerous real-world systems.