Abstract
In the literature on inclusion and inclusive education there is a frequent conflation of (1) inclusion of diverse people, or people in all their diversity, (2) inclusion of diverse worldviews, and (3) inclusion of diverse epistemologies. Only the first of these is plausible—and perhaps even morally and politically mandatory. Of course, more needs to be said about inclusion and its possible difference from integration, conditions of access, etc. Regarding the second type of inclusion, not all worldviews merit inclusion. Moreover, worldviews and epistemologies are not identical: everyone may have a worldview but not everyone has an epistemology. Finally, the idea of diverse epistemologies makes only limited sense, as do the associated notions of ‘indigenous knowledge’, ‘legitimation of knowledge’ and ‘epistemic marginalisation’.
Published Version
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