Distribution of Seats in the New 2021 Czech Government Coalition in Terms of Coalition Theories and Power Indices of Political Parties

Abstract

This study is theoretically anchored in the office-seeking approach and coalition theory of political science. It is based on the most widespread theories of portfolio distribution in executive and legislative bodies (proportionality, power index, voting weights), and it tests these theories using data related to coalition negotiations in the Czech Republic for the new 2021 government coalition, a case of a surplus majority government. The study investigates the distribution of ministerial positions in the government, the office of President (Speaker) of the Chamber of Deputies, and the chairs of permanent parliamentary committees. The analysis also explores the types of electoral coalitions formed; the SPOLU coalition was a superadditive coalition, while the PirSTAN coalition was only an additive coalition. Grounded in the theory of electoral games, the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices and the theory of coalition formation are applied in order to analyse the possible minimal winning coalitions that could be formed following the 2021 elections to the Chamber of Deputies.