Distributing the Fish: Two-Level Games in the Commons

Abstract

Who Gets What? Domestic Influences on International Negotiations Allocating Shared Resources. By Aslaug Asgeirsdottir. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2008. 175 pp., $60.00 hardcover (ISBN-13: 978-0-7914-7539-3). FAO reports suggest that the upper limits on capture fisheries have been reached, leaving little room for increasing production (FAO, 2002:3, 119–120). At the same time, the population of the world has increased, decreasing the available fish protein per capita. As a result, the world is faced with a situation where a significant source of animal protein used for human consumption is under severe stress. Not surprisingly, this has contributed to a scholarly focus on the impact of increasing scarcity on state behavior, including distributional conflicts over fish resources. As Asgeirsdottir notes, the “tragedy of the commons” and the challenges of collective action cast their shadow over the use and management of fish stocks (p. 19). There have been significant interstate confrontations over straddling fish stocks: the “Cod Wars” between the Great Britain and Iceland; the “Turbot War” between Canada and Spain; the “Pacific Salmon War” between Canada and the United States; and multistate disputes over fishing in the Donut Hole, the Loophole, and the Peanut Hole (see, generally, Bailey 1997; Stokke 2001). Many of these conflicts have involved states that would not be expected to resort to using force against each other. As one article noted, “Democracies Don't Fight—Except Over Fish” (Baden and Noonan 1996). Research has found little evidence, however, that competition over fish has been a cause of violent conflict among modern states (see, for example, Homer-Dixon 1999:138; Stalley 2003:44, 49). Instead states have deferred to alternative resolutions. These include …