Abstract
Abstract A commonly expressed sentiment in contemporary political discourse is that bigotry should be disqualifying. In this paper, I consider how this sentiment might be formulated into a more precise moral principle. After identifying problems with several candidate formulations, I suggest the version of the principle that best captures the expression’s intended meaning. I then consider the principle’s justifiability, its value as a decision-procedure, and its power as a discursive act.
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