Direct Realism and the Analysis of Perceptual Error

Abstract

The dominant approach in psychology to the explanation of human cognition is information-processing theory, which is a version of the representative realist theory of knowledge, according to which knowledge of external states of affairs is not direct but rather comes about through the immediate awareness of representations of such states internal to the knower. An alternative to information-processing theory that to date has received little attention in the psychological literature is direct realism, which is the view that the external world, not a representation of it, is the immediate object of awareness. This article addresses a long-standing criticism of direct realist epistemology—namely that it does not enable a plausible analysis of perceptual error. That objection must be overcome if direct realism is ever to be entertained seriously as a means by which to account for the phenomena of human cognition. It is contended here that instances of perceptual error can be accounted for within a direct realist framework by reference to the notions lack of opportunity to cognize, and lack of ability to cognize.