Abstract

During the first two decades of the Cold War, especially during the administration of the United States presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower (19531961) and Lyndon B. Johnson (1963 -1969), relations between the US and Indonesia were marked with suspicion, ambiguity, and antagonism. This was in part due to the failures of many US policymakers in understanding - let alone respecting - Indonesia's culture and politics, especially as they manifested in the political views and personality of Indonesia's first president, Sukarno. Failing to see Sukarno as a Javanese-Indonesian leader whose views on domestic and international politics stemmed from his Javanese background, many Cold War US policymakers considered him a communist demagogue who threatened US interests and world peace.The failure brought far-reaching consequences. Despite attempts by President John F. Kennedy and his administration (1961-1963) to be friendly toward Sukarno, greater pressures against the Indonesian president in the US policymaking formulation remained dominant. One of the results of such pressures was US support during President Johnson's administration for Indonesia's massive anti-communist purge in 1965, which was followed by the removal of President Sukarno from power. The US Cold War policymakers succeeded in their anti-Sukarno course of action, but their success was achieved at the expense of the lives of untold numbers of Indonesians.There are important lessons to draw from this tragic implementation of diplomatic policy, especially with regard to today's post-Cold War international politics, in which foreign policy makers are often challenged to deal with global issues that require diplomatic and military involvement.THE COLD WAR, THE US, AND SUKARNOBy most of the US media and policymakers, particularly since the second half of the 1950s, Sukarno was perceived and depicted as a pro-communist, pro- Soviet Union demagogue who deserved to be pressured in order to comply with US interests. These policymakers acknowledged Sukarno's popularity among his people, but they also believed that the Indonesian president was pushing his country to side with the Eastern bloc, the main foe of the US. The US policymakers recognized Sukarno's prominence among the newly-independent nations, but they were also convinced that the Indonesian leader, if left alone, could ignite worldwide anti-American sentiment among those nations.Thus many US policymakers began to seek ways to pressure or even unseat the Indonesian president. Following debates and argumentation among themselves, these policymakers decided to help anti- Sukarno forces in Indonesia in removing him from power.JAVANESE CULTURE AND THE IDEA OF POLITICAL POWERIn the introduction of his book, The Religion of Java, Clifford Geertz reminds his readers that it is not easy to characterize Javanese culture with a single label or dominant theme: Javanese culture (one of the most influential cultures in Indonesia) is complex.1 Java, the most populated island and home of the country's largest ethnic group, has been influenced by many other cultures over the centuries, including cultures that came from India, China, the Middle East, Portugal, the Netherlands, and neighbouring nations.The influences of foreign cultures made Javanese culture rich and adaptable, able to absorb, incorporate, learn, and develop elements from others. At the same time, these influences contributed to the Javanese tendency to combine elements of one's own culture and tradition with those of other cultures. Not surprisingly, Javanese culture is often described as having a strong tradition of syncretism.Javanese people are typically proud of their culture's richness. Indeed, many Javanese believe that Javanese culture is not only better than other cultures in the Indonesian archipelago, but also the culture against which other cultures of the world should be measured. Based on such confidence, the Javanese believe that Javanese kings should not only use their power to govern fellow Javanese people, but also to influence the world at large. …

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