Diogenes Laertius: Lives of the Eminent Philosophers by Pamela Mensch

Abstract

Reviewed by: Diogenes Laertius: Lives of the Eminent Philosophers by Pamela Mensch Wolfgang-Rainer Mann Pamela Mensch (tr.) and James Miller (ed.). Diogenes Laertius: Lives of the Eminent Philosophers. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. xxi, 676. $ 45.00. ISBN 978-0-19-086217-6. The high production quality here stands out: heavy, genuinely opaque paper; generous line spacing and margins; and, especially, more than 100 beautiful illustrations, drawn from all periods of (mostly, European) art. Together these make the volume seem more like a coffee-table book than a work of scholarship—a fact that presumably accounts for its being for sale in New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art. Its merits are, however, far from being confined to these immediately evident attractions. Mensch's translation, based on T. Dorandi's text (Cambridge 2013), is lively and engaging, and almost always superior to that of R. D. Hicks in the Loeb Classical Library series (Cambridge, MA, and London, England, 1925). But not everything Mensch does is an innovation, nor are all her innovations improvements. Consider this, from book 7, on the Stoics: [107] . . . They apply the term "duty" [καθῆκον] to an action that, when done, can be defended on reasonable grounds, such as its consistency with life; and this extends to plants and animals as well. For "duties" [καθήκοντα] can also be discerned with respect to plants and animals. [109] Actions belonging to duty are those that reason prescribes our doing, as is the case with honoring one's parents, brothers, country, and spending time with one's friends. Actions contrary to duty are those that reason forbids, for example, neglecting one's parents, ignoring one's brothers, being out of sympathy with one's friends, disregarding one's country, and the like. Actions neither belonging to duty, nor contrary to it, are those that reason neither prescribes our doing nor forbids, such as picking up a twig, holding a stylus or a scraper, and the like. Here Mensch reasonably retains "duty," the traditional translation (also Hicks's) for καθῆκον. Of course, her decision to use scare-quotes when speaking of the duties of animals and plants indicates the limitations of "duty." Still, more recent choices, e.g., "proper function" or "appropriate action," lose important connotations of the word, and so are not obviously improvements. For the vexed Stoic term of art φαντασία καταληπτική, Mensch uses "comprehending impression." On its own, this is fine. But is Mensch's "Some impressions involve comprehension, others do not. The comprehending impression, which they say is the criterion of reality, is that which arises from an existing object and is imprinted and stamped in accordance with it. The uncomprehending impression is that which does not arise from an existing object, or, if it does, does not accord with it; it is neither clear nor distinct" (7.44) really better than either of the two following versions? First, B. Inwood and L. P. Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings (2nd edn, Indianapolis 1997): "Of presentations, some are graspable, some non-graspable. The graspable presentation, which they say is the criterion of facts [pragmata], is that which comes from an existing object, and is stamped and moulded in accordance with the existing object itself. The non-graspable presentation is either not from an existing object, or from an existing object but not in accordance with it; it is neither clear nor well-stamped [i.e., distinct];" secondly, A. A. Long and D. Sedley, The hellenistic philosophers, vol. 1 (Cambridge 1987): "(1) Of impressions, one kind is cognitive, the other incognitive. (2) The cognitive, which they [the Stoics] [End Page 235] say is the criterion of things, is that which arises from what is and is stamped and impressed exactly in accordance with what is. (3) The incognitive is either that which does not arise from what is, or from that which is but not exactly in accordance with what is: one which is not clear or distinct." Adding yet another option, as Mensch does, only muddies the waters for no real gain. Now something from Epicurus. In 10.44, from the Letter to Herodotus, Dorandi prints: ἀρχὴ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἔστιν, αἰτιῶν τῶν ἀτόμων οὐσῶν καὶ τοῦ κενοῦ. Mensch translates: "Of these motions there is no beginning, since they are caused...