Abstract

Reviewed by: The Function of Cynicism at the Present Time by Helen Small Jeffrey R. Di Leo Helen Small. The Function of Cynicism at the Present Time Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. xvi + 264 pp. Few ancient Greek thinkers were as colorful or memorable as Diogenes of Sinope—and perhaps no philosophical school from the period is as historically important to understanding contemporary neoliberal culture and society than Cynicism, the one with which his work is associated. As there are no extant writings by Diogenes, much of what has been attributed to him comes from Diogenes Laertius' Lives and Opinions of Famous Philosophers, which is itself a collection of literary and oral traditions, and from literary representations by ancient writers such as Lucian and Dio Crysostom. Moreover, for all of its historical and continuing significance, there is both no extant treatise by anyone directly associated with ancient Cynicism and no record from antiquity that systemizes Cynic thought. Cynicism and the Cynics, which in Greek (kynikos) literally means "dog-like," took their name from "Cynosarges," the building in ancient Athens that housed the school, one that flourished for about a thousand years, from roughly the fifth century before the common era to the fifth century of the common era. Cynicism generally contends that anything that disturbs the austere independence of the will is harmful and should be avoided. The Cynics either ignored or despised both the conventions of society and material possessions—behavior which provoked opposition from both Greek and Roman society. The cynicism of Diogenes might be characterized as follows: (1) There is an ethical standard established by nature that is observable in animals and through cross-cultural comparison inferable to humans; (2) The most fundamental values of society including those of ethics, politics, and religion are at odds with achieving an ethical life because society is at odds with nature; (3) The rigorous discipline (askesis) of corporeal training and exemplary acts is required for humans to realize happiness and their nature because askesis prepares humans to live in the natural conditions of life; (4) The aim of askesis is freedom, self-sufficiency, and happiness in life; and (5) Provocative acts of free speech and the defacement of tradition through parody and satire aimed at subverting established authority exemplify the freedom of the Cynic (Schreier 40; Branham et al. 8–9). Regarding the subversion of established authority, Diogenes is infamously said to have told Alexander the [End Page 370] Great to "Stand out of my light" when the leader of the Greeks offered to grant him one wish while he was sunning himself in the Craneum (Diogenes Laertius 137). Michel Foucault can be credited with a revival of critical interest in the Cynics and Cynicism through his public lectures and later philosophy. In his last public lectures at the Collège of France, for example, held from February to March of 1984, he speaks extensively about the Cynics and their view of life. Of particular note is his commentary on the Greek sources of care (epimeleia) of self, which he regards as beginning in Plato's Laches, a Socratic dialogue where bios appears more the object of care than the soul. For Foucault, Cynicism is the first example of a philosophical practice centered upon the theme of bios as the object of care. But his interest in Cynicism is not merely because of its emphasis on care of self, rather than care of soul—a dominant topic of his later philosophy. It is also because of its emphasis on parrhesia, that is, truth-telling. For Foucault, in Cynicism we find "the requirement of an extremely distinctive form of life—with very characteristic, well defined rules, conditions, or modes—is strongly connected to the principle of truth-telling, of truth-telling which pushes its courage and boldness to the point that it becomes intolerable insolence" (Foucault 165). What is all the more remarkable for Foucault is that the connection between living a certain way and dedication to truth-telling is achieved by the Cynics without the development of a formal system of philosophy, that is to say, "within a fairly rudimentary theoretical framework" (165). Consequently, Foucault regards Cynicism as a form...

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