Abstract
More than 20 countries recently adopted digital services taxes, with many others threatening to do so. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is attempting to convince countries to withdraw their digital taxes in return for an international agreement to implement its Pillar One proposal that would let countries tax prorated shares of the profits of foreign firms with local sales. This paper identifies incentives that countries have to impose inefficiently high rates of digital taxes and calls attention to shortcomings of the OECD’s formulary apportionment alternative. Diverging interests and the inflexible nature of the multilateral bargaining process make prospects for global agreement highly uncertain.
Published Version
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