Abstract
The norm that private property ownership should be conditional on fulfilment of a ‘social function’ diffused widely across Latin America during roughly the first half of the twentieth century, becoming a standard aspect of the region’s legal systems. However, substantive implementation has been rare. This paper seeks to explain the diffusion-implementation gap. It argues that the standard explanation of such gaps, which emphasises the superficial imitation by developing countries of policies and norms devised in advanced societies, does not fit this case. Rather, the gap emerged due to the difficulty of implementing property reform without an institutional breakdown that deposits exceptional power in the hands of pro-reform forces. In the absence of such an event, conservative forces have usually succeeded in blocking implementation. Yet, ironically, even when a breakdown has occurred, this norm has gone largely unimplemented because the resulting concentration of power has made more efficient policy tools viable.
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