Abstract
Rationality imposes constraints on combinations of psychological attitudes. For instance, rationality demands that, at any particular time, if one both intends to φ and believes that ψ-ing is a necessary means to φ-ing, then one ought to intend to ψ . In spite of disagreements about the nature, source, and scope of these rational constraints, it seems uncontroversial that the stock examples concern combinations of contemporaneous attitudes.1 It is not immediately apparent, however, whether there are genuinely diachronic rational constraints, i.e., rational pressures on cross-temporal combinations of attitudes. In this paper, I want to consider the more specific question of whether there might be genuinely diachronic constraints on the rationality of intentions. I maintain that if these constraints exist, they arise in response to the distinctive predicament of agents who have to act over time. Temporal agents are forced to pursue temporally extended activities using resources and abilities that are usually scarce, unequally distributed over time, and unstable. There are three distinct features of the diachronic predicament of temporal agents:
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