Deterrence Measure: A Cause for Promoting Regional Instability in South Asia

Abstract

Deterrence policies are adopted to promote stability; however, in South Asia they have worked against the notion. Instead, they have pushed the participating countries, both regional and global, into an arms race, thereby promoting regional instability. This paper therefore makes an attempt to provide narratives to explain how deterrence policies of India and Pakistan have complicated the securitization process in South Asia, and have made deterrence less unstable. In this regard, first this paper examines deterrence within a conceptual framework and the historical anecdotes that have driven both Pakistan and India into the brink of chaos. Here, we also apply Buzan and Waever’s Regional Security Complex Theory to explain the existing security complexity in the region. Next, the paper examines the deterrence policies adopted by both the nations to protect their national interests. Then the paper shows how the deterrence policies adopted by these countries have encouraged the great powers to penetrate into the region to pacify their security interests. The paper presents a cyclical dynamics to explore the interests of the regional and great powers. Finally, the paper discusses the trickle-down effect of this security complexity on regional stability, followed by actionable recommendations and a conclusion.