Abstract
One of the central concerns of current US foreign policy is that Iran will develop a nuclear weapons capability which it could use to threaten the security of other regional states. This fear exists despite the declassification of a 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) key judgments summary stating that the Iranian nuclear weapons development program was frozen in 2003 and did not appear to have been restarted as of the publication of the report. (1) In elaborating on this NIE in early 2008, the then-Director of National Intelligence, Admiral Michael McConnell, told Congress that he regretted the wording of the document because he felt it left the erroneous impression that Iran had given up on obtaining nuclear weapons. (2) The entire history of the Iranian nuclear technology program, including previous efforts to keep the enrichment effort secret, suggests that Tehran will almost certainly continue to pursue a nuclear weapons capability despite some reassuring factors noted in the 2007 NIE. The NIE itself acknowledges the existence of a secret program, simply by noting its apparent suspension. Iran's continuing and declared focus on nuclear enrichment is particularly disturbing since the development of a large-scale enrichment capability is the most technologically challenging aspect of the effort to construct a nuclear weapon (despite the alternative uses of this technology for peaceful purposes). (3) Additionally, according to a variety of public sources, the Israeli intelligence agencies believe that Iran has made greater progress in moving toward a nuclear weapons capability than is reflected in the NIE or Admiral McConnell's recent comments. (4) British and French leaders have been sufficiently concerned by Iranian activities to issue strong warnings about potential problems from nuclear adventurism. (5) The questions that arise are how dangerous will an Iran armed with nuclear weapons be, and what will be the primary targets for Iranian nuclear weapons should Tehran obtain such a capability? In particular, the incendiary rhetoric of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad suggests that it is reasonable to wonder if there is a high risk that Iran will attack Israel with nuclear weapons during some future period of high Israeli-Iranian tension (such as might emerge out of a new Lebanon war similar to that of 2006). A related question is what can Israel do about such a situation? This article forecasts a serious chance of failure in the current American and global efforts to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons regardless of whether such attempts are pursued through the use of economic and political sanctions or air strikes. It is doubtful that either option can guarantee the end of the Iranian nuclear program for reasons to be discussed later. The more radical option of air strikes has a significant potential to undermine other western goals in the Middle East, including stabilizing Iraq, while failing to do much more than delay the Iranian weapons program for a few years at best. An alternative possibility is that Israel as a potential Iranian strategic adversary will be able to establish a system of deterrence and missile defense based on a combination of technology it already possesses or is developing. Such a system would seriously limit (perhaps even overcome) the chances of a successful Iranian strike against Israel, while raising the cost of even an unsuccessful attack to apocalyptic levels for the Tehran regime. Ideally, Israeli-sponsored deterrence will not have to be maintained indefinitely if the United States and Europe can generate a diplomatic strategy for managing Iranian power, especially if a more moderate leadership eventually emerges in Iran. In this regard, some (but not all) Israeli leaders have not ruled out the possibility that the United States can achieve important diplomatic gains that will benefit Israel in negotiations with Iran. (6) Israeli Concerns Regarding Iran Israel has a unique historical legacy, making it especially sensitive to military threats from hostile powers such as Iran. …
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