Abstract
Applying the theory of deterrence to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, this paper addresses where deterrence failed and identifies applicable lessons. NATO’s success building and reinforce resilience between 2014 and 2022 demonstrates the capability of national resilience to deny an aggressor achieving objectives without escalation. Russia’s use of Strategic Deterrence presents the capability, credibility, and communicated nuclear threat necessary to deter NATO involvement, but Russia’s reliance on other nations within a multi-polar world increasingly diminishes the credibility of their deterrent threat. Finally, the Russo-Ukraine war demonstrates that as a defensive organization, NATO lacks credibility in extended deterrence and must act to safeguard aspiring nations.
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