Deterrence and U.S. strategic force requirements after the cold war

Abstract

The demise of the Soviet Union and the planned reduction of strategic offensive forces have led many to conclude that maintaining an effective policy of deterrence will be less burdensome in the future. That may be correct financially—in the sense that the U.S. strategic offensive nuclear force structure necessary to support deterrence probably will not need to be as robust in the future as it is now. Creation of an effective policy of deterrence in the post‐cold war period, however, will be more challenging intellectually, and the roles that deterrence will have to play will be more demanding as the U. S. military retrenchment from abroad and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continue apace. The traditional U. S. ‐Soviet model of deterrence established during the cold war will be inadequate as the United States confronts a potentially diverse set of unfamiliar opponents. Standard assumptions about the goals, values, and character of the likely opponent will no longer be appropriate, and an effective policy of deterrence will have to be tailored to specific and unique crises. In this emerging context, policies of deterrence will be less reliable in general, and active defenses such as ballistic missile defense will be essential. Nevertheless, it will remain important to establish the most effective deterrent possible; this will necessitate much greater familiarity with numerous potential regional aggressors and an unprecedented degree of flexibility in conventional and nuclear force planning.