Abstract

PTKPC, a coal producer, was facing challenges due to a permit transition in December 2021 from Coal Mining Contract of Work (PKP2B) to Special Mining Business License (IUPK). This change increases operational costs with added royalty rates, value-added tax, and profit-sharing obligations. To address this issue, the company decided to streamline contractors in each department in all business units, consolidating various tasks under one umbrella contract. The goal is to provide a big volume of work, potentially lowering rates and reducing PTKPC’s operational costs. However, relying on a single contractor for crucial operations, as seen in the Coal Terminal Maintenance Department (CTMD), introduces risks. The sole contract winner, PTPB, struggles to meet obligations since the contract’s initiation on December 1, 2021. The average contract fulfillment since commencement date is 86% of 100% desired target, disrupting fixed plant Coal Terminal maintenance activities. Physical availability is 93%, below the 94% target, increasing CTMD’s maintenance costs by $0.059 per ton. This research seeks to identify the root causes of PTPB’s inability to fulfill contractual duties and explore alternative solutions. and then from all the existing alternatives, what is the best alternative in responding to this condition. Utilizing primary and secondary data from PTPB’s monthly proforma invoices, contract scope, and CTMD’s monthly reports, the research employs methodologies like problem tree analysis and stakeholder analysis to unravel business complexities and identify root cause of the problems. Qualitative data collection methods, including focused group discussions (FGD) and semi-structured interviews, will be used to determine alternatives. These alternatives will be assessed using the Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) methodology. The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) methodology, assisted by the AHP Super Decision application, will determine the best alternative: the “Implementation of Warnings and Penalties to PTPB”. Implementing this alternative demonstrates PTKPC’s commitment to stakeholders, ensuring contractor accountability without disrupting fixed plant maintenance. Penalty funds will support CTMD’s financial viability, funding additional resources for tasks beyond PTPB’s capacity. This strategy may be applied to other contracts within PTKPC.

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