Determinants of Success and Failure in Foreign Regime Maintenance Interventions

Abstract

What factors determine the success or failure of external interventions to influence the structure and composition of foreign governments? We maintain that the core challenge facing interventions intended to prop up beleaguered regimes in foreign countries is that success is dependent in large part on the degree to which the incumbent government can secure the domestic public’s compliance. The Army’s new Counterinsurgency Field Manual, FM 3-24, states that “counterinsurgents face a populace containing an active minority supporting the government and an equally small militant faction opposing it. Success requires the government to be accepted as legitimate by most of the uncommitted middle.” Consequently, the manual focuses on building the host government’s political and military capacity in order to win the loyalty of the civilian population by providing superior goods and services than can be provided by the insurgents. The problem, however, is that foreign military intervention is unlikely to increase the legitimacy of an indigenous government and could even further delegitimize the government. Addressing the legitimate grievances of a population may increase a regime’s prospects for survival in the face of a domestic threat to its political authority. But, (1) it may be nearly impossible for some governments to gain legitimacy among a significant proportion of the population, (2) external intervention is unlikely to increase the legitimacy of an incumbent government, and (3) some threats to a regime can be defeated without increasing the government’s legitimacy. Consequently, we argue that a foreign intervention is most likely to improve an incumbent government’s ability to survive a domestic challenge if the characteristics of the conflict between the government and the rebels make it more amenable to a military or “brute force” solution.