Determinants of Audit Fees: Evidence from a Small Capital Market with a Joint Audit Requirement

Abstract

This paper examines audit fees paid by all 126 non‐financial companies listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange in 2002. The Danish institutional setting is theoretically interesting because listed companies are required to use two independent auditors, and the liberal regulation of auditor independence facilitates an examination of the association between consultancy fees and audit fees. Our results indicate that de facto joint audits, where both auditors have significant stakes in the audit, reduce audit fees compared with audits where one auditor is dominant, albeit only for larger companies. We attribute these results to competition between the auditors. Our results clearly confirm previous findings of a positive association between other fees and audit fees. On balance, we find the core audit fee determinants model to be well specified for the Danish data, although small companies seem to differ somewhat from large companies. Finally, we find no additional Big Four effect from the appointment of a second Big Four auditor. However, our results indicate that the use of PWC is associated with lower audit fees in large companies and higher audit fees in small companies.