Destabilization and Intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean

Abstract

For Latin America and the Caribbean, 1979 was another turning point: The Cuban Revolution celebrated its twentieth anniversary; the New Jewel Movement came to power in Grenada in March; and the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN) defeated the Somoza dictatorship in July. The political and economic paths pursued by the revolutionary leaders in these countries confirmed the worst fears of many policymakers, businesspeople, bankers, and trade union leaders in the United States. They became convinced that not since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis had U.S. security and economic interests in the Caribbean and Latin America in general been endangered so seriously. The cordial political and material relations forged between Grenada and Cuba and Nicaragua and Cuba, as well as the growing Eastern bloc trade by the two newest members of the so-called Marxist triangle, were as conclusive proof as was needed of the alleged and oft-repeated dangers of Soviet/Cuban expansionism in America's backyard. Events in the Caribbean and Central America have been of concern to national policy since the Monroe Doctrine (1823), and a fear that foreign powers might gain a foothold in adjoining territories is a preoccupation that dates from at least 1811 (Connell-Smith, 1974: 46). Considering direct military intervention alone, the Caribbean has suffered the presence of U.S. troops on its shores and soil more than any other region. Even prior to 1898 and the Spanish-Cuban-American War, U.S. troops had landed in the Caribbean and Mexico more than thirty times (U.S. Congress, 1969). Then there are the better-known and longer military occupations of this century: Panama, 1903-1914; the Dominican Republic, 1903, 1905, 1916-1924, 1965-1967; Cuba, 19061909, 1912; Honduras, 1907; Nicaragua, 1909, 1912-1925, 1926-1933; Haiti, 1915-1934; and Grenada, 1983; among others. Of course these interventions were due to geography and economics, but that is just the